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Abstract: The controversy about the mining project at Rosia Montana is unsolvable in the actual 
institutional environment. The alternative institutional setting, defined according to “free market 
environmentalism” principles offers a frame favorable to the emergence of a solution compatible with individual 




“Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin, 1968). This problem has two 
solutions: limiting freedom or defining property rights. Environmental problems are basically 
similar to the “tragedy of the commons” and so are their solutions. The mainstream approach 
– as reflected by mass media, economic handbooks and environmental regulation – gives the 
main role to the limitation of freedom. Until recently, the idea that free market could protect 
the environment was opposed, mocked or, at best ignored. 
The case of Rosia Montana makes no difference. The large scale mining project has 
been in the high-light of national dispute for the last decade and most of the solutions to the 
problem were based on regulations, interdictions and limitations of freedom. 
We argue that this approach is not able to solve the conflict; it can only promote one 
side’s interests. On the other hand, the free market approach promotes negotiation among the 
parties involved so that the solution is more likely to be a positive sum game with benefits for 
all.  
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
The controversial mining project of Rosia Montana is analyzed from two points of 
view. The first one identifies project’s main characteristics and the solutions proposed by 
interested parts in the current context, namely a situation where decisions are taken by the 
political factor, in a hierarchical, top-down process. It appears that this mechanism encourages 
radical (“all or nothing”) positions rather than negotiations, with strong incentives to contest 
any given result by the losing parties. In this political process, the results are never final; they 
are depending on the changing political majorities. The system doesn’t offer guaranties for the 
environment. 
The second approach, known as “Free Market Environmentalism”, considers that 
property rights (and their enforcement) represent a stronger protection for the environment. 
The arguments are familiar to economists and refer to uncontestable facts that characterize 
human life, such scarcity and opportunity cost, incentives and individual interest, differences 
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in people’s values (beliefs) and goals, etc. In this situation, conflicts and competition are 
unavoidable and their results can be either constructive or destructive. Well defined and 
enforced property rights are the most effective way of preventing destruction and stimulating 
productive behavior (Stroup, 2003). All these facts apply also to the environment; therefore 
principles of economics can be applied to environment problems. For example, bison almost 
disappeared from North America and cow population increased, despite the higher and 
increasing industrial demand for the latter. The significant difference was that, unlike cow, 
nobody owned bison. The situation is different today, with a growing population of private 
bison (Yablonski, 2007). Property rights and contractual freedom make possible to have oil 
drill in a conservation area, like those of National Audubon Society (Anderson et al., 2001). 
Therefore, the first question is whether free market environmentalism principles are 
respected in the case of Rosia Montana. The second question concerns the consequences of a 
coherent application of these principles. The research consisted in analyzing relevant 
literature, on site visits and interviews. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
1. Incomplete property rights, the real cause of an unsolvable controversy 
 
Rosia Montana is a small village situated in the West Carpathians (or “Apuseni”) 
Mountains. Its existence can be traced through history back to the Roman period when it was 
known as Alburnus Major. Ever since those times the main occupation of the people was gold 
mining and traces of the Roman dwellers as well as of the Middle Ages’ miners could be 
found all over the place. The breathtaking scenery and the picturesque villages create an 
idyllic image that charms anyone. But, at a closer look one could see the extreme poverty and 
the lack of the most basic facilities such as roads, tap water, sewage or gas as well as the deep 
scars left by centuries of mining. Most of the inhabitants are unemployed and the children 
from the remote villages have to walk for several miles to school (Universitatea Ecologică, 
2003). 
Nobody seemed to notice neither the beauty nor the sadness of this forgotten place until 
a foreign company saw the opportunity of extracting more gold. But their method was to use 
cyanide to extract pure gold from the low-density ore. This implies vast deforestations and the 
construction of a huge ore-processing complex, which includes a cyanide destruction 
component, and a reservoir (a “tailings dam”) to capture and contain the processed rock. In 
the process some villages, including Rosia Montana, would eventually have to be moved to 
some new locations.  
Rosia Montana is one of the World’s richest gold fields from which the Canadian 
mining company wishes to process 13 million tons of ore per year for 17 years and to extract 
300 tons of gold and 1600 tons of silver per year (Academia de Studii Economice, 2003). 
According to the lease contract, awarded by the Romanian Government behind closed doors, 
the profit shares are very favorable to the mining company while the Romanian side is only 
entitled to a share of 2% of the total production. 
For a region with a high unemployment rate, poor infrastructure and environmental 
degradation the mining project may seem like „a golden” opportunity. It would help create 
about 1200 jobs during construction phase and 600 more for the operation phase (Stantec and 
Giovannetti, 2006). The opponents of the project argue that the jobs available for the locals 
would be only low qualification jobs and just during the construction period. The rest of the 
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work force would be imported from other regions or from abroad. Therefore, benefits for the 
local community would be minimal (Academia de Studii Economice, 2003, p. 6). 
Nevertheless a project of such amplitude could attract other investors to Rosia Montana. 
Citing other similar mining projects, the Canadian company estimates that for each job the 
project creates, ten other would appear (Stantec and Giovannetti, 2006, p. 50). This way, they 
say, the region would flourish and the living standards would improve significantly. 
Still, the opponents complain that a mining project of such a scale would only increase 
the mono-industrial dependency of the region and will destroy the natural habitat and the 
cultural heritage of Rosia Montana. They offer tourism, as an alternative, by taking advantage 
of the beautiful landscapes and of the Roman heritage. This alternative doesn’t look very 
feasible, though, due to the poor infrastructure and the lack of facilities. 
The environmental issue raises one of the most important threats related to the Rosia 
Montana project. The technologies involved and the fact that large areas would have to be 
bulldozed over are enough reasons for many people to be against the mining project. Even 
though cyanide is used without major environmental damage in other gold explorations and 
that modern technologies offer a high level of safety for the management of dangerous waste 
materials many people find those risks too high to be worth taking.  
The decision to allow or not the mining project is primarily a political one. The political 
approach implies the existence of two sides with opposite interests who fight for the support 
of the political power. In the aftermath, all we get is a win-lose scenario where the winner 
takes all (Anderson et al., 2001). The selection criteria are not always transparent and they 
refer neither to efficiency nor to property rights. The lack of intelligible, rational, previously 
announced and durable criteria generates uncertainty and arbitrary. As a consequence, 
significant resources are wasted also on lobbying for gaining political support. This is an 
endless process, with results valid at most until the next election. 
The political approach of Rosia Montana project doesn’t show all the costs and benefits 
of the project. It fails in presenting the costs of non-exploring the resource (opportunity costs) 
and in pointing those who bare those costs. (Anderson, 2001, p.78). Indeed, on one hand, the 
Canadian mining company doesn’t bear the cost of potential environmental damage, the loss 
archeological sites and of potential tourists. On the other hand, national and international 
NGO’s face no opportunity cost when they oppose the project: they don’t lose any potential 
income because they don’t own the natural resources (gold and silver ore). If an 
environmentalist organization owns a land with valuable resources, it bears the full 
opportunity cost when it opposes to their extraction. In this case – like National Audubon 
Society – it would have incentives to find a way to use that resource (with minimum damage 
to the environment). 
When this key element – property rights – is lacking, an uncompromising strategy is 
“rational” because it has no direct cost on its promoter, but only diffused costs on third 
parties.  
 
2. Property rights, the frame for a potential solution 
 
A Free Market Environmentalism analysis of the Rosia Montana issue identifies where 
property rights are violated, where the interests of Romanian tax payers are overlapped and 
where and why scarce resources are misappropriated by free-riders. 
For instance, the way that the lease contract was signed raises serious doubts. First of all 
it was awarded directly to the Canadian company without an open and transparent 
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international auction procedure. Moreover, even though natural resources are considered by 
law as public goods (and therefore belonging equally to all Romanian citizens), the contract 
has been classified as state secret and kept away from public eye. 
Another controversial issue regards the old mining permits awarded by the Romanian 
Government to individuals and to private companies and then confiscated by the communist 
regime. Starting from the 19th century the villagers were allowed to lease mine corridors or to 
explore the ore from their property. During this period Rosia Montana and the whole area 
knew its most spectacular development. After 1918, Romanian Government continued to 
encourage private initiative in gold mining giving leases for 90 years to small mining 
associations and even to individuals (Baron, M., 2006). It all ended tragically for the miners 
with the confiscation imposed by the communist regime. After 1989, instead of recognizing 
the old leases, the state decided to declare the zone as underdeveloped. Instead of their rights 
the locals received subsidies, welfare and many, many promises. Sustainable development – 
an increasingly popular topic – did not materialize in improving environmental and living 
standards. 
Last but not least, the public good approach of the natural resources causes a tragedy of 
the commons’ problem at Rosia Montana. Valuable resources such as minerals, land, water, 
environmental quality and cultural heritage are placed in open access being either 
overexploited or left for degradation. 
An institutional frame compatible with the “Free Market Environmentalism” principles 
(property rights, rule of law, and a free market) would require at least the following elements: 
a) The publication of the contract concerning the mining project 
This would allow to verify its compliance with international practice but also its economic 
pertinence. 
b) Recognizing the old mining permits and the need to settle this dispute. 
It is necessary to recognize these rights and the fact that they were not used during more than 
half century. An interesting debate is to establish who will have to compensate them if the 
mining project will continue: the state or the mining company.  
c) Defining and enforcing property rights over water. 
One of the most efficient and effective ways of settling this problem is by enforcing the 
principle of riparian rights. According to this principle the riparian owner has the right to have 
water flowing past his land in its natural state of purity. “If water is polluted by a proprietor 
higher upstream, causing damage to the lower riparian proprietor, he has a good cause for 
action against the upper proprietor” (Meiners et al., 2000, p.87; see also Segerfeldt, 2005). 
The reference level of pollution would be that existing just before starting the mining project. 
d) Defining and enforcing property rights over land using the Anglo-Saxon division of 
property rights: surface rights, mineral rights and rights over the air. 
The common law doctrine defines property rights as a bundle of transferable rights that can be 
sold separately. Having tradable property rights, the owners will have to face the full costs of 
their actions, including the opportunity costs (Anderson and Leal, 2001, p. 83). That means 
that environmental groups could stop the project by buying land or mining permits. The 
company would have to pay the real value of the land and resources especially if there was a 
counter bid from environmentalist groups. This way, the valuable resources would be held by 
those who foresee highest future value of the resources.  
e) Full responsibility 
This means that environmental risks are covered by an insurance policy subscribed by the 
mining company to a well-rated international insurance company. 
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In this alternative institutional arrangement, it is impossible to predict if the mining 
project will be started or no. The result will depend less on changing political decisions and 




Stopping or banning the mining project won’t solve the core problems in the Rosia 
Montana case because such a solution doesn’t affect the real cause of the problem it only 
deals with its effects. If we look beyond the negative effects of the mining project we would 
see the true causes: a poor definition and enforcement of property rights, regulations of 
private enterprise and limitations of liberty. In other words, an institutional frame meant to 
impose the state authority over individuals, which favors the redistribution of wealth and 
encourages interest groups over productive activities. Even without the controversial project, 
the environment is seriously damaged after decades of collectivism in resources management.  
The alternative solution is an institutional reform, with property right as a landmark. 
Redefining and enforcing property rights will not solve miraculously all the problems in 
Rosia Montana but at least this will set the frame favorable to the emergence of a solution 
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